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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-21-3(2)(2002).
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellee's statement of the issues presented are stated differently than as set
forth in the statement provided by Appellant; however, the following statements track
the issues argued in Appellant's Brief.
I.

Did the trial court correctly determine that Smith conveyed his interest in the
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift, despite Cazares' allegation that Smith
failed to comply with U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a) and § 41-la-902?
Standard of Review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the trial
court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed
for correctness. White v. Gary L. Deeselhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d
1371, 1374 (Utah'1994).

II.

Did the trial court correctly determine that U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a) and §
41-la-902 fail to provide a private right of action?
Standard of Review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the trial
court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed
for correctness. White, 879 P.2d at 1374.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of the following statutes may be determinative, or of central
importance, to this appeal:
1. U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a): "To transfer a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor the
owner shall endorse the certificate of title issue for the vehicle, vessel, or
outboard motor in the space for assignment and warranty of title."
2. U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(b): "The endorsement and assignment shall include a
statement of all liens or encumbrances on the vehicle, vessel, or outboard
motor."
3. U.C.A. § 41-la-902(2): "At the time of any sale or transfer of a motor vehicle,
the transferor shall furnish to the transferee a written odometer disclosure
statement in a form prescribed by the division. This statement shall be signed
and certified as to its truthfulness by the transferor...."
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case is a breach of contract dispute for the sale of three vehicles, including
a Toyota Tundra ("Tundra"), a Lincoln Navigator ("Navigator") and a Hydroswift boat
and trailer ("Hydroswift"). The Plaintiff/Appellee is the seller of these three vehicles
and Defendant/Appellant is the buyer.
On October 25, 2005 the parties came before the Fourth District Court, the
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield presiding, for trial. R. at 237. At the conclusion of

trial, the court issued the following undisputed findings of fact (undisputed because
Cazares is not appealing the findings):
1. In March 2003 the parties entered into an agreement that Cazares would buy and
Smith would sell the Tundra on terms whereby Cazares agreed to become
obligated for the remaining payments due on Smith's underlying obligation to the
lender. R. at 236.
2. Subsequently, on June 9, 2003, the parties memorialized their agreement in
writing regarding the Tundra ("Tundra Agreement"). Id.
3. Pursuant to the Tundra Agreement, Cazares agreed to purchase the Tundra from
Smith for the purchase price of all monthly payments remaining on the
underlying financing agreement between Smith and the lender, to make such
payments on a timely basis, to maintain insurance on the vehicle in his own
name for so long as Smith retained title to the Tundra and to maintain the vehicle
in good operating condition. R. at 235-3.6.
4. The parties also agreed that Smith would hold title to the Tundra until Cazares
paid all payments in a timely manner pursuant to the Tundra Agreement. R. at
235.
5. Further, the parties agreed that Cazares would have possession of the Tundra so
long as he was not in breach of any material term of the Tundra Agreement. Id.

6. Cazares received delivery of and accepted the Tundra approximately eight
months before the parties entered into the Tundra Agreement. At the time of the
Tundra Agreement, Cazares again accepted the Tundra and retained possession.
Id.
7. Cazares breached his obligations under the Tundra Agreement by failing to make
payments as they were due and in the amount that they were due. Cazares also
refused and failed to return possession of the Tundra to Smith after he had
defaulted and he kept the Tundra in his possession for at least eight months
without making the required payments. R. at 234.
8. Eventually, Cazares surrendered the Tundra to Toyota Financial for
repossession in January 2004. Id.
9. Also on June 9, 2003, the parties entered into a written agreement for the
purchase and sale of the Navigator ("Navigator Agreement"). The terms of the
Navigator Agreement were identical to the terms of the Tundra Agreement,
except that the amount of the monthly payments differed. R. at 235.
10. On or about this same day, Cazares accepted and held possession of the
Navigator until he returned the vehicle to Smith. Id.
11. Cazares also breached his obligations under the Navigator Agreement by
surrendering the Navigator to Smith on September 13, 2003 and failing to make
any payments thereafter. Cazares also failed to maintain insurance on the

Navigator, which caused the lender to place a substitute insurance on the vehicle
and bill Smith for the insurance cost. R. at 234.
12. Shortly prior to July 3, 2003, the parties entered into a verbal agreement
whereby Cazares agreed to purchase the Hydroswift from Smith on terms
identical to the terms and provisions of the Tundra Agreement, except that the
monthly payments were set at a different amount ("Hydroswift Agreement").
Id.
13. The terms of the Hydroswift Agreement are set forth in an unsigned document
that the trial court found to reflect the agreement reached by the parties. Id.
14. On July 3, 2003, at Smith's instruction, Cazares picked the Hydroswift up from
storage at the boat dealer's place of business. Cazares informed the dealer that
he was purchasing the Hydroswift from Smith. Smith's wife confirmed the sale
with the dealer via telephone. R. at 233-34.
15. Subsequently, Cazares'paid for the service charges on the Hydroswift and took
possession of the boat. That same day Cazares met Smith's wife and son to
receive training and instruction on operating the boat. R. at 233.
16. At that time, Smith's wife also gave Cazares the written Hydroswift
Agreement. Cazares agreed to sign the Hydroswift Agreement and deliver it to
the Smiths. Id.
17. Cazares took possession of the Hydroswift and held possession until he
returned the boat to Smith on September 13, 2003. At the time Cazares returned

the Hydros wift, it was in damaged condition, including the hull, propeller, skeg,
upholstery and the interior. Id.
18. Cazares breached his obligations under the Hydroswift Agreement by failing to
make the required payments. Id.
19. Following the return of the Navigator and Hydroswift, and the repossession of
the Tundra, Smith attempted to make monthly payments on the vehicles, but was
unable to financially make all payments. Thus, Smith voluntarily surrendered
the Navigator and Hydroswift to the respective financial lenders. R. at 232-33.
20. Each vehicle was sold by the respective financial lender and Smith was charged
with the costs of sale. Further, after deducting the amount realized from each
sale, Smith was charged a deficiency judgment for the remaining unpaid
obligations. R. at 232.
21. Smith's action in voluntarily permitting repossession of the vehicles and
allowing them to be resold was reasonable under the circumstances. R, at 23 L
22. Each of the agreements entered into between the parties provide for an award
of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action to
enforce the terms of the agreements. R. at 230.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cazares is appealing the trial court's ruling that Smith transferred title to the
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift despite his failure to comply with U.C.A. §41-1 a702 and § 414a-902. Further, Cazares is appealing whether the default provision in

the agreements between the parties is valid and enforceable. However, Cazares appeal
should be dismissed and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed for the reasons set
forth below.
First, Cazares failed to properly raise either of these issues in the trial court and,
thus, they are not ripe for appeal. For example, at trial, the court held that Cazares
failed to properly plead his claims regarding U.C.A. § 41-la-702 and § 41-la-902.
Further, Cazares did not raise an issue and there was no discussion at trial regarding
the enforceability of the default provisions. Accordingly, Cazares' appeal should be
dismissed because he failed to properly raise these issues below.
Second, Cazares claims that the facts are undisputed and only an issue of law is
on appeal. However, Cazares inconsistently asserts many findings that contradict the
Court's actual findings. In order for Cazares to properly challenge the Court's factual
findings, he must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
demonstrate that even viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Smith* the
evidence is insufficient to support the Court's findings.
However, Cazares failed to marshal any evidence in support of the Court's
findings and has placed that burden upon Smith instead. In reviewing the trial
testimony and exhibits, the record demonstrates that the trial court had sufficient
evidence to find the parties entered into written contracts for the Tundra and the
Navigator, and a binding oral agreement for the Hydroswift. The Court also had
sufficient evidence to find that Smith mitigated his damages. Accordingly, this Court

should accept the trial court's factual findings in full and disregard Cazares' challenges
to said findings since he failed to appropriately marshal the evidence.
Third, assuming arguendo this Court finds Cazares has properly preserved his
issues on appeal, his appeal should be dismissed nonetheless because U.C.A. § 41-1 a702 and § 41-la-902 do not create a private right of action for Cazares. Smith's failure
to convey the certificate of title and/or odometer disclosure statement potentially only
creates a right of action for the State. In fact, Cazares admits that the State, not
Cazares, has an interest in maintaining accurate motor vehicle information. Cazares is
not harmed by the State's inability to maintain accurate motor vehicle records.
Further, the statutes do not prevent parties from entering into other sale
agreements. The pertinent statutory provisions are not intended to be controlling
between parties to a transaction. They do not confer substantive rights and are merely
intended to warn prospective purchasers of existing encumbrances. Thus, the mere fact
that Smith did not comply with these statutes, does not give Cazares the right la enter
into these contracts, use the vehicles for months without making die required payments
and then claim he has no interest in the vehicles under U.C.A. § 41-la-702 and §41la-902. Moreover, Cazares fails to cite any legal support providing him with a private
right of action.
Fourth, Cazares' appeal is without merit because he received equitable title to
the vehicles. Cazares claims he never received an interest in the vehicles because
Smith did not convey the certificate of title or odometer disclosure statement.

However, these requirements do not convey substantive rights and equitable title may
pass regard lev -
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Thus, the validity of the default provision is irrelevant to the trial court's decision
Finally, Smith is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs since he was
awarded fees below, ^and such is provided \o\ in the agreements between the parties,
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However, Cazares failed to properly raise these issues below and thus, they are
not ripe for appeal. "It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties
in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton,
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). See also Hart v. Salt Lake Co.
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
As to Cazares' claims regarding U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and § 41-1A-902, the trial
court already ruled that Cazares failed to plead either of these claims properly. R. at
265:16-22. Specifically, the trial court stated that, "the law obligates a person who is
wishing to raise affirmative defenses to plead them, meaning to put everybody on
notice of them. The first time that [these claims] are then disclosed in the court's file is
here today." Id. Further, the trial court emphasized "there is no pleading that raises
an affirmative defense." Id. At 266:3-4. Moreover, Cazares also failed to properly
raise the issue that the contracts between the parties were allegedly unenforceable due
to the default provision.
Accordingly, Cazares failed to properly raise the applicability of U.C.A. § 411A-702 and § 41-1A-902 as an affirmative defense and he also failed to properly raise
the issue of the enforceability of the default provision. Thus, Cazares' appeal should
be dismissed since he failed to properly raise the issues below as required.
II.

CAZARES FAILED TO MARSHAL FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION

If this Court finds that Cazares properly raised his appeal issues below, his appeal
should nonetheless be narrowly construed and dismissed. Although Cazares attempts to

present his appeal issues as questions of law, he simultaneously challenges the trial
court\ findiin' of fart. However, an appellate courl will aiuse lo address such
challenges to the findings unless the a^ncllant has property marshaled the ev idence.
See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); Witear v. Labor Comm'n, 973
P.2d 982, 985 ( [ Jtah Ct. App. 1998). "To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant
mu st i nai \shal i ill the " evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even
v i e w i n g the evidence in i\\r lii'bt

IIHN

favorable to dial verdict, I In: evidence is

insufficient to support it." Martinez v. Wells, 88 P.3d 343, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(citations omitted; emphasis added).
If an appellant fails to properly marshal facts, "the court of appeals must assume
that the record, supports the findings of the trial coi n f ' Egg eft v. W asalch Energy
Corp,, 2004 UT 28, f 10 (citation omitted); Valcarce I ' Fitzgerald, 961 P 2< 3 3 0 5 , 312
(Utah 1998). If an appellant properly marshals the evidence, he must show that such
evidence is legally insufficient to support the challenged findings when viewing the
evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. Child, 972 P.2d at
433. Finally, not only must the courl of appeals com hide tin! a finding b a;.»anM fhr
clear weight of the evidence for it to be clearly erroneous, but the court of appeals must
also "give 'due regard' to the trial court's opportunity to assess the credibility of the
numeroi is witnesses called by eacl i part y. : " Reid \ \ M utual of Omaha Insurance Co,,
776P.2d896, 9w= - i . ^ *989)

In the present case, the trial court issued detailed findings based on a full day of
testimony and more than 30 exhibits introduced into evidence. Despite these findings,
Cazares has failed to marshal any evidence in support of the trial court's findings.
Further, Cazares has failed to acknowledge that the trial evidence must be viewed in a
light most favorable to Smith and that the appellate court must give "due regard" to the
trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses.
Because Cazares has failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling,
but instead has placed that burden on Smith to show this Court that evidence exists to
support the trial court's ruling (evidence which Cazares should have marshaled), this
Court should accept the trial court's findings in full and ignore Cazares' challenges to
said findings. Following is a list of trial testimony and documentary exhibits that
support the trial court's ruling:
1.

First, Cazares claimed that the parties allegedly did not enter into a written
agreement for the Lincoln. However, this is contrary to the trial court's<
findings and evidence presented at trial.
• Trial Exhibit 22 is a written contract entered into on June 9 that provides for
the sale of the Navigator,
• The Court found that Cazares had the Navigator in his possession. R. at
263.
• The Court found that Cazares surrendered the Navigator on the 13th of
September 2003. Id.

2.

Second, Cazares asserted that the parties did not enter into an agreement for
the Hydroswift. Yet, the evidence presented demonstrates and the trial court
found that the parties entered into a binding oral agreement for the Hydroswift

•

®
•
•
•

3.

Miiith testified that Cazares wished to buy the boat. The trial court found
that Smith's testimony was the most credible and consistent with all the
evidence. R. at 264.
Smith testified that the dealer would not allow Cazares to t;.> ;ae
Hydroswift without call Smith to verify that he was selling
Cazares paid for repairs to the Hydroswift and took it. Id,
Cazares received instruction from Smith's family members on how to use
the Hydroswift Id.
Cazares was presented with a contract for the Hydroswift (similar iv the
contracts for the Tundra and Navigator) and he agreed to the terms. A7.
See also Trial Exhibit ?4.

Third, Cazares aUr*!r- M,^

M

;i(h failed in i!titii»ate hr damages. Again, tins

is contrary to die Courfs findings that Smith did a number of things to
mitigate damages.
•

Smith permitted the underlying lenders to retake possession of the
property. R. at 231
• Each lender eventually resold I heir repossessed property in a reasonable
fashion. R. at 165-67.
• Smith credited Cazares for the amounts his loans were reduced as a result
of the proceeds from the auction sales. R. at 165.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing lists of testimony and exhibits which Cazares
failed to marshal in his appeal brief, the trial court's findings that the parties entered
into binding contracts for the Pi indra , Navigator and Hydrosudi is well supported in
the record. Also, the trial court newr made ;i fnidim' UKM ( -iniUi alleged]}' jailed h»
mitigak hi damages. The evidence demonstrates Cazares' complete failure of
•'...'iiiiiii: his duiv on appeal to marshal facts in support of the trial court's findings and
'

..:•'.- hs *• *•. v ..K atl), based on the ease law eu-,-d aiu^-e, this Court should accept

the trial court's findings in fall and reject Cazares' unsupported challenges to said
findings.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT U.C.A. § 41-1A702 AND U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 DO NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION FOR CAZARES

Cazares' appeal should be dismissed because U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. §
41-1A-902 fail to provide him with a private right of action. Cazares argues that Smith
allegedly failed to convey his interest in the Tundra, Navigator and Hydros wift because
he never conveyed a certificate of title (U.C.A. § 41-1A-702) or an odometer
disclosure statement (U.C.A. § 41-1A-902). However, assuming arguendo that interest
in a vehicle does not transfer without a conveyance of the certificate of title and
odometer disclosure statement - which Smith contests below - such does not create a
private right of action for Cazares.
The Motor Vehicle Act provides that "[t]o transfer a vehicle, vessel, or outboard
motor the owner shall endorse the certificate of title issued for* the vehicle, vessel, or
outboard motor . . . ." U.C.A. §41-la-702(l)(a). Further, "[a]t the time of any sale
or transfer of a motor vehicle, the transferor shall furnish to the transferee a written
odometer disclosure statement in a form prescribed by the division . . . ." U.C.A. §
41-la-902(2).
However, the trial court correctly held that neither statute prevents the parties from
entering into other agreements. R. at 266:7-9. Thus, simply because Smith did not
convey title or an odometer disclosure statement, does not prevent the parties from

-. ^rriKj into contractual obligations nor does it give Cazares the right to enter into
these contracts, i lse these vehicles, keep the ' I i mdra for many months withoi it payii lg
for it and then claim he has no liability because he never had an interest in the vein, t is
under these statutes. See R. at 266:11 15 Ultimately, the right of action belongs ,u
the State - i.e., the Motoi V ehicle Department, <V nc M-L-. court held: "If the Motor
Vehicle Department wants to come and attack the validity of this transaction they may
do so." Id. at 266:9-11. In fact, Cazares failed to cite any legal support pinvitlini! linn
with a private right of action pursuant to these statutes.
Instead, Cazares relies on policy reasons for establishing a private right >f u<„ik .
I ?or example, Cazares claims that the purpose behind these statutes is for the State to
maintain accurate motor vehicle records and to a ssist in identifying vehicle owners, I le
also asserts that these statutes protect the interests of financial institutions as secured
creditors. Assuming these policies are supported by IJ.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and/or
U.C.A. § 41-1A-902, Cc:/;:"^ :;:;[> u. -...\piaiL u-^w -.a;d policies provide'him., with, a
private right, of action

If invfhini1. those policies suppott Si MI t IT •- [position dial (lie

statutes provide the State with a right of action, and not Cazares. Under these policies,
Cazares is not harmed by the State's inability to maintain accurate motor vehicle
records or a financial iiMiluhoifs ability to track, its interest in, collateral. Thus, neither
of these policies support Cazares' posmon thai 11 ( \A ft -| I I A 1\)1 andon i i,(' A $
41 • IA-902 provide a private cause of action.

The only policy presented by Cazares to possibly support his argument that U.C.A.
§ 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 provide a private right of action is that the
statutes protect individuals from fraudulent conveyances. Cazares explains that where a
debtor encumbers his interest in a motor vehicle to a third-party, this third-party's
interest is supposedly unprotected absent a written record or conveyance of title. The
third-party could be required to make all the payments to the lien holder under the guise
he would obtain title, yet he would allegedly have no recourse against the debtor since
the third-party's name is not on any of the documents.
However, this policy also fails to create a private right of action generally for a
third-party and specifically for Cazares. In a general sense, the statutes fail to confer
any substantive rights and are merely intended to warn prospective purchasers of
existing encumbrances. The statutes are not intended to protect a party involved in the
transaction. For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Group, 868 P.2d 110 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),-the Court examined U.C.A. §; 41-1-72
(1988), which contains similar language and requirements as the statutes at issue in the
present case.1 Id. at 112. Yet the Utah Supreme Court held that this section does "not
'U.C.A. §41-1-72provides:
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate of registration and
certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall
be deemed not to have passed, and said intended transfer shall be deemed to
be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for any purpose....
Although this section is no longer a part of the Motor Vehicle Act, the requirements are
comparable to those set forth in U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 and the
interpretation of this section is applicable to the statutes currently at issue.

confer or deny substantive rights', but that it merely provides "a flag of warning to
piospective innsferees or «*iieurnbntiinH
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235, 237 (Utah 1939). U.C.A. § 414-72 was "written to protect innocent f )urchasers
and third parties from fraud", but it was "not intended to be controlling as between the
parties to a transaction."
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Id. (emphasis added).
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to transfer title. Also, the third-party would have recourse against the debtor through
;i

.LM;:

•;.

VMT

betwec flj

?

. ,

• . ••

^..MIW

snd evidence could be presented to establish the agreement

*;.*'-

'i M.

transfer of acerti r i ••- • ir.ic r\ \ .v-M\-- :e> i

third-party would not automatically establish a contractual relationship hetu ••••?! •
parties in any event. A court would nonetheless be required to hear the evidence and
testimony'feprd'ffif'-thS'parties' agreement, with or without a transfer of title.
Specifically, tin private right of aelion r; created lm Cazares because he was a party
to the transaction. In addition, Cazares' policy argument fails becai ise the parties did in
fact have written records formalizing their agreements. The statutes provide no
protection for Cazares against a fraudulent conveyance in this instance because the
UMiisaetions were documental ,'iiid - y- •{>". >.i : . -. i c.igage iu ai:\ iraudulent conduct.
Accordingly, C.C.A

§41 I A- /U1 and 11( \ A fid I i A (KL! fail to piovkh

Cazares with a private right of action.

IV.

CAZARES' APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE HE
RECEIVED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE VEHICLES AND SMITH'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
DOES NOT NEGATE CAZARES' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

Even if Cazares establishes that U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and/or U.C.A. § 41-1A-902
provide a private right of action, his appeal should be denied because it is without merit.
A. Cazares Received Equitable Title to the Vehicles
Cazares asserts that Smith allegedly failed to convey interest in the Tundra,
Navigator and Hydroswift because Smith never conveyed the certificate of title or an
odometer disclosure statement. However, U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902
do not convey substantive rights, they are merely procedural or evidentiary in nature,
meaning that equitable title may pass regardless of whether these other documents are
conveyed by the seller.
For example, in Allstate, an employee decided to personally purchase a vehicle
from a company that leased vehicles to his employer. Allstate, 868 P.2d at 111. The
employee tendered payment, but before legal title formally transferred, the vehicle was
involved in an accident. Id. The employee's insurance company (Allstate) and the
employer's insurance company (Liberty Mutual) disputed who held title to the vehicle at
the time of the accident and thus, who was ultimately responsible for insuring the
accident. Id. at 112. The Court held that the employee was, "at the time of the accident,
the purchaser, possessor, and equitable title holder" of the vehicle, even though "legal
title had not yet formally been transferred into his name." Id. at 113 (emphasis added).

In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Jackson, which provides that the
provisions ofl i (\A ^ 41-I- 7 ? ;in/ "procedural 01 evidential) in luiturc""1 in urderto
provide warning to prospective transferees. Allstate Ins. Co., 868 P.2o ai
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Jackson, 89 P.2d at 237. As stated above, this section was "written to protect innocent
pi ii chasers and th ird parties from o--;- -•< = : ; were] not intended to be controlling as
between the parties to the transaction
In addition, in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Holt, 503 P.2d 1205
(IJtah :lJ "JV an employee was purchasing a vehicle from his employer through monthly
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the employee was involved in an accident and a dispute arose as to who was the owner
and who was liable for the vehicle, Id. "According to Holt, equitable title passes to the
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Also, in Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951), the appellants contended that
(be failure of the transferor to "effectuate a transfer of title on the records of the State Tax
Commission, had the same effect u^ it'n<» \iilr hud been omsuuimated , , ' Id. at \Ml.
However, the Court held that "[ojbviously, the equitable title passes to the r. r h:-;s- • ipon
a bona fide sale for value." Id. The statute requiring re-registration is "for the legal title
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Similar to the employee in Allstate, Cazares had tendered some payment, but he
had not received a formal transfer of title. Nonetheless, Cazares held equitable title to the
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift even though "legal title had not yet formally been
transferred into his name." Allstate Ins. Co., 868 P.2d at 113. Likewise, the employee in
Holt and Cazares both made payments for some period of time, yet they never received
formal, legal title. However, the Court should find, as in Holt, that Cazares received
equitable title despite the lack of formal requirements being completed. Further, under
Dahl, Cazares became the equitable title owner of the relevant vehicles upon the bona
fide agreement for sale of the vehicles. The purpose of the registration and title statutes
are to give notice to innocent purchasers and are only necessary for legal title to pass.
Accordingly, since Cazares received equitable title to the Tundra, Navigator and
Hydroswift, his argument that Smith allegedly failed to convey interest in these vehicles
is without merit. Cazares obtained an equitable interest in the vehicles by entering into
a bona fide sale, taking possession of the vehicles and making some payment? toward
the vehicles. Smith's failure to comply with U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A902 does not affect whether Smith conveyed his interest in the vehicles. These provisions
are merely procedural and are intended to protect potential innocent buyers.
B. Smith's Failure to Comply With Statutory Requirements Does Not
Negate Cazares9 Contractual Obligations
Although Smith may not have complied with the statutory requirements
presented by Cazares, such does not negate Cazares' contractual obligations. Pursuant
to Cazares' argument, merely because of a failure by Smith to comply with the

statutory provisions, Cazares would be entitled to retain and use the vehicles, fail to
make contractually required payments and subsequently disclaim all obligations to
Smith since legal title had not yet passed. In fact, this is exactly what he tried to do.
Cazares had possession and use of the Tundra for eight months, during which time he
failed to make payments and now he is asserting that he has no responsibility for this
vehicle. The trial court correctly held, "I don't, I simply don't think that creates a
private right of action and that that negates the contractual obligations the parties
entered into." R. at 266:19-21.
Accordingly, Cazares may not negate his contractual obligations merely because
Smith did not convey legal title to the vehicles pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and
U.C.A. § 41-1A-902.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SMITH IS
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 70A-2-709

Cazares argues that the default provision in each agreement between the parties is
allegedly illusory and unenforceable. However, this appeal issue is without merit and
should be dismissed since Smith did not seek to enforce the default provision, but he
instead sought his actual damages pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-2-709.
The trial court correctly found that Smith's remedy for Cazares' breach of contract
was an action for the price pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). R. at
166. The remedies provided by the UCC, "shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed." U.C.A. § 70A-1-106. Specifically, an action for price exists, "[w]hen

the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due." U.C.A. § 70A-2-709(l). See also
R. at 166. Further, if Smith has control of the goods, he is obligated to mitigate
damages by making "reasonable efforts to resell the goods at a reasonable price",
unless "circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." Id.
Cazares is not appealing the trial court's finding that he failed to make payments on
the three contracts as they became due, nor did he dispute this in the trial court. R. at
166. Further, although Cazares indirectly challenges the trial court's finding that Smith
mitigated his damages, Cazares does not specifically raise this issue on appeal. Smith
mitigated his damages by allowing the lenders to repossess the vehicles, allowing the
lenders to resell the vehicles in a reasonable fashion and giving Cazares credit for the
amount his loans were reduced as a result of the auction sales. Id.
In addition, the trial court correctly found that Smith was also entitled to incidental
costs of the sale incurred "in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise
resulting from the breach/' U.C.A. § 70A-2-709(l) and § 70A-2-710. See also R. at
164. Cazares' breach of the agreements caused Smith to default on his agreements and
Smith subsequently incurred incidental costs on the resale of the vehicles.
Accordingly, Cazares' appeal regarding the default provision should be denied since
Smith sought damages pursuant to the UCC and not under this provision of the
agreements. Even if the default provision was supposedly invalid, such would not
affect the trial court's ruling on damages and thus, it is unnecessary to examine the
validity of the default provision.

VI.

SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
COSTS

Pursuant to the parties' contracts, Smith is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
and costs on appeal if he prevails. "A court may award costs and attorney's fees to
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon...written contract...." U.C.A. §
78-27-56.5. Further, the trial court found that, "[e]ach of the agreements entered into
between the parties provide for an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the
party prevailing in any action to enforce the terms of such agreement." R. at 230, f 33
(emphasis added).
In addition, " [t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal." Utah Deft ofSoc. Servs. V. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). See also Tretheway v. Furstenau, 40 P.3d 649, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)
(citations omitted). The trial court found that "Smith [was] entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees under the terms of the agreements...." R. at 228, f 9.
Accordingly, pursuant to the contracts between the parties and Smith's award of
attorneys' fees below, Smith is also entitled to attorneys' fees and costs if he prevails
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief, Plaintiff/Appellee Kirby Smith respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment, and deny this appeal in its

entirety. Further, Smith requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
defending this appeal.
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